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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SCHOOL BOARD CONTROL OVER EDUCATION AND
A TEACHER’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY

RALPH D. MAWDSLEY, J.D., Ph.D.*

I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy in its broadest meaning is the protection of an individual’s interest
in making decisions free of government interference.1 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2 protects “a
right of personal privacy”3 that includes “the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions.”4 However, the right to make
decisions without government interference is not without limits. For public
school teachers, their expectation of privacy is diminished by the reality that
they have been employed to instruct students, most of whom are minors
required under state compulsory attendance laws to attend school.
School boards entrust teachers with the responsibility to provide students
with the knowledge and skills that comport with board policy. When teachers
instruct students, board members expect that teachers will adhere to approved
guidelines and conduct themselves in school settings in an appropriate and
professional manner. When teachers deviate from these guidelines or act in a
manner that board members and school officials consider not to be in the best
interests of the school district, disciplinary action may result.
Privacy issues for teachers can arise in four areas: first, personal privacy,
essentially freedom to make lifestyle choices; second, physical privacy,
essentially freedom from search and seizure; third, instructional privacy,
* Ralph D. Mawdsley is Professor, College of Education and Human Services, Cleveland State
University. He holds a J.D. from the University of Illinois and a Ph.D. from the University of
Minnesota. Dr. Mawdsley teaches School Law, Sports Law, and Special Education Law to
graduate and law students. In addition to having over 300 publications, including fifteen books,
to his credit, he speaks regularly at education law conferences in the United States, Europe, South
Africa, and Australia.
1. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045
(1985) (non-tenured teacher’s privacy right might have been violated if school board’s nonrenewal decision was based on her divorce).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[No] State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”).
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
4. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
609

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

610

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:609

essentially freedom to provide appropriate knowledge and skills in the
educational setting; and fourth, associational privacy, essentially freedom to
establish relationships with students and others in settings related or unrelated
to the workplace.
Privacy as a protected right for employees in the United States is grounded
in several constitutional provisions.5 Most generally, the notion of privacy is
associated with confidentiality of information, which is protected under both
the Liberty Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment6 and the
Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.7
However, an expanded understanding of privacy can find protection under the
concepts of the right of association protected under the Liberty Clause and the
First Amendment,8 expression of ideas under the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment,9 and practice of one’s religious beliefs under the Free
Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment.10 In addition, every state
has confidentiality statutes protecting disclosure of employee information and
constitutional provisions similar to those in the Federal Constitution.11
II. TEACHERS AND SCHOOL BOARDS: RIGHT TO PRIVACY VS. CONTROL
This article will examine teacher privacy and the authority of school
boards to control teachers. The discussion of this topic will address four areas:

5. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property . . .”).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . .”).
8. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“[w]e have long understood as
implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding
right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends.”).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . .”).
10. Id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof”).
11. For the differing approaches of two states, cf. S. Bend Tribune v. S. Bend Community
Sch. Corp., 740 N.E.2d 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (under state Public Records Act, school board
was not required to reveal information about job applicants) with State ex rel. Dayton
Newspapers v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 747 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (under State Public
Records Act, school board was required to reveal names, applications, and resumes of candidates
for position of superintendent). But see State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Cincinnati Bd. of
Educ., 788 N.E.2d 629 (Ohio 2003) (school district did not have to reveal to media employment
application materials submitted to board members during executive session, but returned to each
applicant at end of interview where materials had never been “kept” by board under state Public
Records Act in order to make them public records).
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personal privacy, physical privacy, instructional privacy, and associational
privacy.
A.

Personal Privacy

A teacher’s personal life, as for most persons, touches upon a variety of
areas, from choice of clothes and accessories12 to sexual orientation.13 While
teachers have considerable latitude in making personal choices, state interest in
avoiding Establishment Clause violations has been sufficient to uphold statutes
prohibiting the wearing of religious garb in schools.14 Similarly, teachers’
challenges to dress codes requiring that they wear certain kinds of apparel have
withstood constitutional privacy scrutiny.15 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in upholding a teacher dress code reasoned that:
Just as the individual has an interest in a choice among different styles of
appearance and behavior, and a democratic society has an interest in fostering
diverse choices, so also does society have a legitimate interest in placing limits
on the exercise of that choice.16

However, newer areas of litigation concerning discrimination involving
transsexual17 and transvestite18 individuals have recognized that, while choice
of appearance is not a fundamental right, employers must have a rational basis

12. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bd. of Educ. for the Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d 882, 893-94
(3d Cir. 1990) (enforcement of Pennsylvania’s religious garb statute prohibiting wearing of
religious apparel, could be enforced against a Muslim teacher over against Title VII
discrimination claim); Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540, 560-61
(W.D.Pa. 2003) (elementary school instructional assistant suspended for wearing a cross, 1 &
7/16 inches in length and 15/16 inches in width, around her neck granted preliminary injunction
reinstating her where court determined that she was likely to prevail on claim that school board’s
religious affiliations policy prohibiting the wearing of religious jewelry violated the Free Exercise
Clause and the Free Speech Clause as a form of personal expressive speech on a matter of public
concern).
13. See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002); Lovell v.
Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (teachers had protection
under Equal Protection Clause for alleged discriminatory treatment regarding sexual orientation).
14. See generally Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d at 891; Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist.
No. 41, 723 P.2d 298, 308, 311 (Or. 1986).
15. See East Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of East Hartford, 562 F.2d 838,
855 (2d Cir. 1977) (school board teacher dress code requiring that men wear coats and ties
upheld); Tardiff v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir. 1976) (dismissal of teacher for too-short
skirts upheld).
16. East Hartford, 562 F.2d at 862.
17. See Lie v. Sky Pub. Corp., 2002 WL 31492397 at *1-*2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (a
transsexual is a person with the physical and genetic characteristics of one gender but who
emotionally and mentally wants to be a member of the other sex).
18. Id. at *2 (a transvestite, or cross-dresser, is a person who wears the clothes of the
opposite sex). See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (“DSM-IV”) 533 (4th ed. 1994).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

612

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:609

for their apparel decisions.19 In a non-education case, the Illinois Supreme
Court struck down a Chicago ordinance prohibiting a person from wearing
clothing of the opposite sex with intent to conceal his or her sex.20 The court
found that the ordinance’s purpose in prohibiting cross-dressing to prevent
fraud on the public lacked a rational basis and was “fundamentally
inconsistent” with “values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal
integrity that . . . the Constitution was designed to protect.”21 Generally
though, claims regarding what is referred to as “gender non-conformity” have
come to be addressed in discrimination actions under federal or state law rather
than under the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22
Reported case law thus far involving privacy rights of teachers and gender
non-conformity is minimal,23 in large part because federal statutes prohibiting
discrimination do not designate gender non-conformity as a protected category.
However, the Supreme Court’s pivotal case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins24 has
had the effect of encouraging a rethinking of protected categories.25 In Price
Waterhouse, the Court broadened the understanding of “sex” under Title VII26
to include stereotypical thinking about the employee based on sex.27 Since
Price Waterhouse, at least two federal circuits have weighed in, finding that
sex under federal statutes encompasses both biological differences between
men and women as well as actions based on failure to conform to sociallyprescribed gender expectations.28 However, at least one other federal circuit

19. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970).
20. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1978).
21. Id. at 531 (quoting Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
22. See, e.g., Lie, 2002 WL 31492397 at *4.
23. For an example of an attenuated employee gender non-conformity case, see Cruzan v.
Special School Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Circuit rejected female teacher’s
claim that the school’s permitting a transgendered male to use the female teachers’ restroom
constituted religious discrimination).
24. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
25. Lie, 2002 WL 31492397 at *3.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2004). Employers are prohibited from “fail[ing] or
refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .” Id.
27. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. In a promotion review, one partner “described [the
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse] as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being
a woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’” Id. Furthermore, the partner
who informed the plaintiff of the decision not to promote her advised her to “walk more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Id.
28. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (pre-operative maleto-female prisoner had section 1983 claims under Eighth Amendment and Gender Motivated
Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2004), as a result of rape by a guard); Rosa v. Park West
Bank & Trust, 214 F.3d 213, 214-15 (1st Cir. 2000) (biological man who was denied a loan

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

SCHOOL BOARD CONTROL OVER EDUCATION

613

continues to define “sex” to mean “biological male or biological female” and
not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation.29
As a general rule, the status of gender non-conformity under federal law or
the Federal Constitution has become irrelevant because many states, local
municipalities, and school districts have acted to afford protection.30 In
addition, the increasing number of successful harassment law suits, brought
largely by students for damages under section 1983 and the Equal Protection
Clause, has unquestionably mandated attention from school board members,
administrators, and teachers, with the likelihood that the climate generally
regarding gender non-conformity will change in schools.31
The effect of the recent Supreme Court decision Lawrence v. Texas32 on
privacy issues relevant to gender non-conformity remains to be seen. In
Lawrence, the Court reversed the criminal conviction of two men for violating
Texas’s anti-sodomy statute.33 Although the defendants raised a number of
constitutional arguments, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, resolved
the case solely on the ground of whether “the petitioners were free as adults to

application because he was dressed in traditionally female clothing established a prima facie case
of sex discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2004),
sufficient to avoid a motion to dismiss). For two cases from the same circuit prior to Price
Waterhouse, see Blackwell v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183, 1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(recognizing an employment discrimination claim based on the handicap of transvestitism as
covered by the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (FRA), 29 U.S.C. § 701-96, on the basis of
transvestitism); Doe v. United States Postal Service, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1867 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (plaintiff had an employment discrimination claim under the FRA on the basis of
transexualism). However, FRA was amended in 1990 to exclude “gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairments.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(8)(F)(i) (2000). For similar language
under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), see 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (2000).
29. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (interpreting “sex”
under Title VII).
30. See, e.g., Goins v. West Group, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001) (transgender former
employee had sexual orientation claim under state’s Human Rights Act); MADISON, WIS.,
MADISON CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 3.23 available at http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/eGov (last
visited Mar. 31, 2004) (sexual orientation protected under city ordinance).
31. See, e.g., Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1132, 1135 (9th Cir.
2003) (students who experienced anti-gay name-calling remarks could sue school officials for
failing to enforce anti-harassment policy); Massey v. Banning Unified Sch. Dist., 256 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1091, 1093-94, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (eighth grade student barred from physical education
class after she revealed that she was lesbian had equal protection claim, and school officials not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified
Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095-96, 1098, 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (students subjected to a
variety of forms of harassment based on their sexual orientation had § 1983 and Equal Protection
Clause claims against school officials for failing to address the harassment).
32. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
33. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (prohibits “deviate sexual
intercourse” between members of the same sex). In this case, the sexual intercourse in question
involved anal intercourse between two males. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475-76.
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engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due
Process Clause. . . .”34 He cautioned states against controlling relationships
that “whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, [are] within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”35 Finally,
because the act in this case occurred in a home, he opined that “adults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”36 In overruling
Bowers v. Harwick,37 in which the Court upheld a conviction under Georgia’s
anti-sodomy law, Justice Kennedy observed that the Court in Bowers
incorrectly stated the key issue as being “whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”38 In his
opinion, this mistake demonstrated the Court’s “failure to appreciate the extent
of the liberty at stake.”39
The extent to which Lawrence will affect privacy rights involving gender
non-conformity of teachers is not clear and will probably not be clear for some
time. Justice Kennedy’s observation that Lawrence did not involve minors40
suggests the obvious, namely that Lawrence is not likely to provide privacy
protection for teachers convicted for committing sexual acts with students.
Aside from this obvious limitation, what implications might Lawrence have for
teachers in school settings?
Justice Kennedy’s observation that the case did not address “whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter”41 suggests possible tensions among teacher privacy
rights, federalism, and local school board control over education. For example,
if states are free to prohibit homosexual marriages and are not required by the
Full Faith and Credit Clause42 to recognize such marriages from other states,
what are the implications for teacher privacy rights concerning gender nonconformity in the classroom?43 If State “A” does not permit homosexual
34. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
35. Id. at 2478.
36. Id.
37. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-89 (1986).
38. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2484.
41. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State . . .”).
43. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 172 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (upholding
dismissal of an action seeking to dissolve a civil union marriage entered into in Vermont pursuant
to that state’s civil union statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1202 (2002)). The court observed that
because Connecticut recognized only marriage unions between men and women, courts in the
state lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a homosexual union. However, the court skirted the Full
Faith and Credit Clause issue because all of plaintiff’s contacts were with Connecticut and the
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marriages and a teacher from State “A” enters into a marriage in State “B” that
does permit such, could a school district in State “A” discharge the teacher?
Does Justice Kennedy’s statement in Lawrence that petitioners were “entitled
to respect for their private lives”44 provide broad protection for teachers, or
will Lawrence be limited to its facts, namely protecting acts occurring only in
the home, as opposed to a school?45 The key question yet unresolved is the
extent to which the Lawrence Court, in overturning the criminal convictions,
placed homosexuality (and in a broader sense, all gender non-conformity) on
the same constitutional footing as traditional patterns of heterosexuality.46 A
broad reading of Lawrence suggests that Liberty Clause privacy rights may
well extend to most forms of gender non-conformity. If so, school boards, for
example, would have to provide a constitutionally sufficient rational basis for
making employment decisions regarding gender non-conformity.47
B.

Physical Privacy

Physical privacy for teachers, as for other employees, means intrusion into
their persons and property, particularly as related to searches of a person’s
property and searches in the form of requiring urine samples for drug testing
purposes. Searches are intrusions on a person’s privacy, and the Fourth
only contact that plaintiff had with Vermont was entering into the civil union. Id. at 174-75, 17879.
44. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
45. See id. at 2478. Because the criminal convictions resulted from an act occurring in a
home, the application of Lawrence to places other than the home is not clear in light of Justice
Kennedy’s observation that the prohibited conduct touched “upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private places, the home.” Id.
46. The Lawrence Court relied on Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court invalidated,
on privacy grounds, a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive drugs, contraception, or
counseling for married persons. 381 U.S. 479, 480, 485 (1965). However, in a subsequent case,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court, in striking down a law prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives for unmarried persons, appeared to expand privacy protection noting that although
the Griswold Court placed emphasis on the marriage relationship and the marital bedroom, “[i]f
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1973) (emphasis in original).
47. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1099, 1102-03, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
that Georgia Attorney General withdrawing an offer of employment after finding out about
candidate’s lesbian marriage was not subject to strict scrutiny, and Attorney General had
sufficient interest in promoting efficiency of important public service under Pickering balancing
test to reject candidate.) For an example of balancing free speech rights involving expression
about gender non-conformity, see Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that a teacher opposed to homosexuality was not permitted to create his own
bulletin board in the hallway to counter the school’s board on gay and lesbian month on which
faculty were permitted to post items). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the school’s bulletin board
represented government speech and the teacher had no right to post different viewpoints about
speech on which the school had expressed a viewpoint. Id. at 1016-17.
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Amendment ensures that a person’s expectation of privacy will not be intruded
upon by government officers unless probable cause exists.48
However, not all public places are the same in terms of an expectation of
privacy, as the Supreme Court indicated in three student search cases involving
drugs, New Jersey v. T.L.O.,49 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,50 and
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County v. Earls.51 The Court held in all three cases that probable cause did not
apply to searches of students by school officials and that officials needed only
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search.52 As the Supreme Court has yet to
decide a school employee search and seizure case, the question becomes the
extent to which diminished expectation of privacy for students, in large part
because of the confined and custodial nature of schools, should also apply to
teachers.
In T.L.O., where the Court upheld an individualized suspicion search of a
girl’s purse that produced evidence of drug dealing, the Court, for the first
time, articulated that student searches required only reasonable suspicion but
had to be reasonable both as to inception of the search and the scope of the
search.53 Thus, in T.L.O., a charge by the teacher that T.L.O. was smoking in
the restroom, along with the girl’s denial that she had been smoking, provided
reasonable suspicion to open the purse and to look for cigarettes and, upon
seeing and removing a pack of cigarettes, to continue the search when drugrelated items were seen.54
The T.L.O. Court found the probable cause standard of the Fourth
Amendment “unsuited to the school environment” because a requirement that
school officials secure a search warrant before conducting student searches
“would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”55 In finding that reasonable
suspicion, despite diminishing the privacy rights of students, was an
appropriate standard because of “the substantial need of teachers and

48. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (Court refused to create a “firearms
exception” to reliable informant requirement for a probable cause search, where police had
received an anonymous phone call that resulted in a gun being found).
49. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
50. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
51. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002).
52. Id. at 828-29; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53; T.L.O., 469 U.S. 340-41.
53. Reasonable suspicion “is not a requirement of absolute certainty.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
346. The Court found that “[b]ecause the hypothesis that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes in her
purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent with
the teacher’s accusation.” Id.
54. Id. at 346-47.
55. Id. at 340.
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administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools,”56 could the Court
apply that holding to teachers as well?
In Earls, the Court, reinforcing its decision in Vernonia by upholding
mandatory universal and random drug testing for students participating in
extracurricular activities, observed that individualized suspicion for a search
was not required because of “the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility
for children.”57 The Earls Court opined that “[w]hile school children do not
shed their constitutional rights when they enter the schoolhouse” under Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,58 the Court in
Vernonia added that “Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public
schools than elsewhere.”59 Clearly, the context for diminished privacy in
T.L.O., Vernonia, and Earls involves students, but one can argue that setting a
lower reasonable suspicion standard for students and requiring a higher
probable cause standard for teacher searches in the same school environment
would be inconsistent and anomalous.60 Because teacher constitutional rights
in schools owe their origin to the same Tinker Court decision as for students,61
teacher rights, arguably, should be subject to the same ebb and flow of
Supreme Court interpretation as for student rights.
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision addressing school employee
search and seizure, the closest case is O’Connor v. Ortega where the Court,
relying heavily on T.L.O., set forth guidelines for search and seizure of public
employee property.62 In O’Connor, public hospital supervisors conducted a
search of the office of a doctor in charge of residents, purportedly looking for
evidence of alleged sexual harassment and suspected coercion of past residents
to donate money for the doctor’s new computer. The search, which involved
mainly looking through the doctor’s personal possessions, revealed no

56. Id. at 341.
57. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).
58. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
59. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
60. Of note is the qualification in Tinker where, in granting constitutional rights to teachers
as well as students, the Court made the grant “in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment . . . .” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
61. Tinker is an interesting decision because the case involved only student litigants and
teachers were not a party to the lawsuit; nonetheless, the Court chose to gratuitously accord rights
to teachers at the same time it did for students.
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.
Id. (emphasis added).
62. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (all facts in this section are taken from
pages 712-14 of the Court’s opinion).
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evidence of either allegation. When completed, the doctor’s personal
possessions and hospital property were boxed together, and despite the
supervisors’ claim that they entered the office in part to take inventory, no
inventory in fact was taken.
In applying T.L.O., the Court in O’Connor opined that the employer must
“balance the invasion of the employee’s legitimate expectations of privacy
against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient
operation of the workplace.”63 The Court defined workplace broadly so as to
include all of those areas over which the employer exerts control, which for
teachers could include areas such as hallways, break rooms, desks, file
cabinets, and classrooms.64
An employee’s expectation of privacy is determined by the circumstances
of the workplace, which the O’Connor Court indicated is influenced by the
amount of access employees have to an area.65 In O’Connor, the Court
suggested that the employee had a greater expectation of privacy where he did
not share his locked office with other employees,66 a marked difference, one
could argue, from a teacher’s classroom where school administrators, other
teachers, substitute teachers, janitors, and students have ready access to the
room.67 The O’Connor Court also observed that the hospital had no policy
regarding personal items at the workplace, although the Court cautioned that
absence of such a policy did not create an expectation of privacy where one
would not otherwise exist.68 In other words, personal items, such as pictures
and letters on a teacher’s desk, are still part of the workplace and might be the
subject of a search.
Applying the T.L.O. requirement of reasonableness for a search as to
inception and scope, the O’Connor Court found reasonable grounds for
searching an employee’s office to include finding a record, report, or file,
conducting an inventory of items in the office, and investigating alleged
misconduct.69 The scope of a search in the workplace was more problematic
for the Court, and it cautioned that a workplace did not necessarily apply to a
63. Id. at 719-20.
64. Id. at 715-16.
65. Id.
66. However, even locked offices would have a diminished expectation of privacy if they
“are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits . . . . [S]ome government offices may be
so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable.” Id. at
717, 718.
67. Accord see Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 218 F. Supp. 2d 266
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (school district not liable for allegedly not returning personal items of a teacher
discharged for misconduct with students because teacher had been given two opportunities to
remove the items and had failed to do so).
68. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719.
69. Id. at 725-26.
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piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that happens to be
within the employee’s workspace.70 Whether an employer could search
personal items would depend on whether the particular items for which the
search has been conducted might reasonably be located in the places being
searched.
Ultimately, the search in O’Connor failed the test under T.L.O. because it
was “at best, a general and unbounded pursuit of anything that might tend to
indicate any sort of malfeasance – a search that is almost by definition,
unreasonable.”71 Seventeen years after filing his lawsuit for unlawful search
and seizure (and eleven years after the Supreme Court decision), the doctor
who had been discharged recovered $376,000 in compensatory damages and
$60,000 in punitive damages against the two supervisors.72
Cases applying the search principles of T.L.O. and O’Connor to school
employees are rare. However, a recent Ohio appeals court decision examined
employees’ expectation of privacy where a building principal, suspecting third
shift janitors of taking unauthorized breaks, installed a hidden video camera in
a break room.73 The videotape revealed that janitors were taking unauthorized
breaks and, upon being disciplined, they challenged the videotaping as an
unlawful search. In upholding the principal’s action, the court observed that
the janitors could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in a break room
that was accessible to all employees and contained a washing machine, a
clothes dryer, cleaning supplies, lockers, a refrigerator, and a microwave
oven.74 The inception of the search was justified by the principal’s reasonable
suspicion about the unauthorized breaks, and the scope of the search was
acceptable because it was less intrusive than it could have been as the principal
had turned off the sound and recorded only the visual images.75
Both T.L.O. and O’Connor suggest that teachers would have a reduced
expectation of privacy regarding most places in schools, at least as to
classrooms where teachers work and file cabinets where teachers store items.
In such places, school officials would need only reasonable suspicion that the
search would turn up evidence of work-related misconduct or work-related
items such as records or files. The scope of a search would meet Fourth
Amendment requirements as long as the measures adopted for the search are
reasonably related to the search’s objectives and are not excessively intrusive

70. Id. at 716.
71. Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1163 (9th Cir. 1998).
72. See id. at 1154.
73. Brannen v. Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(all facts in this section are taken from page 88 of the court’s opinion).
74. Id. at 92.
75. Id. at 92-93.
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“in light of . . . the nature of the [misconduct].”76 Relying on T.L.O., the
O’Connor Court held that:
Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests
of government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the
standard of reasonableness.77

The Court is silent as to the appropriate standard for searches of personal
places such as teacher purses or brief cases. However, it is arguable that the
reasonable suspicion, inception, and scope tests from T.L.O. would apply in
much the same way as for students.
Suspicionless searches of teachers would be difficult to justify using the
student cases of Vernonia and Earls. In those cases, the Supreme Court
supported drug testing for students in extracurricular activities because
participation was voluntary and because the extracurricular groups had rules
not applicable to non-participating students.78 If students chose not to
participate, or decided to cease participation, suspicionless searches would no
longer apply and searches of those students could only be conducted under
T.L.O.’s individualized suspicion standard.79 If suspicionless searches are to
be used for teachers, they obviously need a different legal rationale than the
one used for students.
Although a number of courts have upheld the use of random drug tests for
janitors80 and school bus workers,81 the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Knox County
Education Association v. Knox County Board of Education82 is the highest
court decision to date upholding random drug testing for teachers. The court in
Knox County likened teachers to other “safety sensitive” positions, such as
customs employees and railway employees, positions for which the Supreme
76. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 342 (1985)).
77. Id. at 725.
78. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-32.
79. Although the Earls Court does not specifically reach this result, the Court’s observation
that the results of the drug tests were not “turned over to any law enforcement authority” and did
not “lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic consequences” suggests very
strongly that positive test results could not be used for the same kind of discipline associated with
individualized suspicion. Id. at 833. See also Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F.
Supp. 2d 919, 930 (N.D.Tex. 2001) (court invalidated school drug testing policy that applied to
all students in junior and senior high schools); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095,
1109-10 (Colo. 1998) (court struck down random drug testing policy as applied to students
involved in marching band for which academic credit was awarded).
80. See Aubrey v. Sch. Bd. of Lafeyette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1998).
81. See English v. Talledaga County Bd. of Educ., 938 F. Supp. 775, 782-83 (N.D.Ala.
1996).
82. See Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 366-70 (6th
Cir. 1998).
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Court has upheld random drug testing.83 The Sixth Circuit found that a school
board has a very strong interest in having teachers (and administrators) sober
and not under the influence of drugs, because they must act immediately to
protect students when a dangerous event occurs and because they are in “a
unique position to observe children and learn if they are involved in activities
which can lead to harm or injury to themselves or others.”84 The court
determined that the teachers’ expectation of privacy was diminished because
the taking of a drug sample was not intrusive and because the teaching
profession is highly regulated.85 The teachers’ concerns regarding the
intrusiveness of the drug test was satisfied because providing the drug sample
could be done in private without monitoring, except in cases where there is
reason to believe a teacher will adulterate the sample.86 The court also
observed that “when people enter the education profession they do so with the
understanding that the profession is heavily regulated as to the conduct of
people in the field, as well as to the responsibilities that they undertake toward
their students and colleagues . . . .”87 As a result, “teachers should not be
surprised if their own use of drugs is subject to regulation and testing . . . .”88
Absent state statutes, collective bargaining agreements, or school board
policies regulating teacher searches,89 the expectation of privacy that teachers
have in their person or property follows the standard already set forth
regarding students. Although only one federal appeals court has thus far ruled,
suspicionless searches (drug testing) do not appear to be excessively intrusive
on the privacy of teachers and are constitutionally permissible, although the
justification for such testing differs from the one given for the testing of
students.
C. Instructional Privacy
The U.S. Supreme Court has given considerable authority to local school
boards and school administrators to control schools. Teachers’ claims that
they should be left alone in the classroom to instruct according to their own

83. See generally Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raub, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (for
customs employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (for railway
workers).
84. Knox County, 158 F.3d at 379.
85. Id. at 379-84.
86. Id. at 380.
87. Id. at 384.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Hearn v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 191 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (school
board policy providing for teacher consent for a search warrant for search of teacher’s personal
property, in this case a car in the parking lot, not applicable where the basis for school official’s
ordering a teacher to take a drug test occurred outside the parameters of the policy).
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instructional techniques and methodologies have been framed under a variety
of constitutional theories: privacy, free speech, and free exercise of religion.
Among the responsibilities of school administrators are the evaluation and
supervision of teachers, which under state law and/or collective bargaining
agreements generally require that administrators observe teachers in the
classroom.90 The extent to which teachers have protectable privacy interests in
their classrooms has not been extensively litigated. However, the limited case
law available indicates that the interest school administrators and school
boards have in knowing what teachers are doing in the classroom and how they
are performing overrides whatever privacy interests a teacher might have, even
if classroom observations result in discipline.
In Roberts v. Houston Independent School District, a Texas appellate court
permitted a school board to use a 30-minute videotape which included excerpts
of five separate videotapes made of a teacher’s classroom as the evidence for
the termination of the teacher for inefficiency or incompetence. 91 The court
observed that the teacher had no right of privacy to be free from intrusion into
her classroom for purposes of videotaping her teaching, even though she had
objected to the videotaping.92 In upholding dismissal of the teacher, the court
in Roberts reasoned that “the activity of teaching in a public classroom does
not fall within the expected zone of privacy” and that this reasoning even
applies when “involuntary videotaping” of a teacher’s performance occurs.93
The court also noted that the teacher “was videotaped in full view of her
students, faculty members and administrators [and] at no point did the school
district attempt to record [the teacher’s] private affairs.”94
In Evens v. Superior Court, a California appellate court held that a
videotape surreptitiously taken by students of a teacher could be viewed by a
school board for purposes of determining whether the teacher should be
disciplined.95 The court brushed aside the teacher’s claim that, under state law,
evidence of “a confidential communication” cannot be used in any
administrative or judicial proceeding.96 The court’s response was that “the
videotape recording at issue here was made in a public classroom” and was
therefore not considered “a confidential communication.”97 In addition, the

90. See, e.g., Naylor v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 630 N.E.2d 725, 728-29
(Ohio 1994) (school board failed to satisfy statutory requirement regarding evaluation of teacher
and therefore her probationary period was extended one additional year in order for board to
properly provide appropriate evaluation).
91. Roberts v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 788 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
92. Id. at 111.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Evens v. Super. Ct., 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
96. Id. at 499; CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(d) (West 1999).
97. Evens, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499.
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court found inapplicable a criminal statute that prohibited the use of any
electronic listening or recording device made in a classroom without the
consent of “the teacher and the principal.”98 Despite statutory language that
any person other than a pupil committing a prohibited act was guilty of a
misdemeanor and “any pupil violating this section shall be subject to
disciplinary action,” the court determined that nothing in the act “prohibit[ed]
entities such as the [School] Board and [School] District from using videotape
recordings made by students in violation of the statute in disciplinary
actions.”99 In general, the court opined that, because students generally discuss
their teacher’s actions with parents, administrators, and other students, “a
teacher must always expect ‘public dissemination’ of his or her classroom
‘communications and activities.’”100
Teachers also argue under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
in protesting interference with their conduct in the classroom. As with cases
involving physical privacy, Supreme Court guidance involving free speech
comes not from school employee cases, but from two decisions involving
students, Bethel School District No. 402 v. Fraser101 and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.102
In Bethel, the Supreme Court expanded the authority of schools to punish
student speech that is vulgar.103 The Bethel Court upheld suspension of a
student who delivered a brief speech containing sexual innuendo.104 The
campaign speech, made on behalf of another student, was delivered in the
school auditorium where other students were in attendance.105 Although the
disruption from the speech was minimal, the Court rejected the student’s free

98. Id.; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51512 (West 1989).
99. Evens, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51512 (West 1989).
100. Evens, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499.
101. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
102. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
103. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
104. Id. at 685, 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). The speech was as follows:
“I know a man who is firm — he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is
firm — but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.”
“Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts — he drives hard, pushing
and pushing until finally — he succeeds.”
“Jeff is a man who will go to the very end — even the climax, for each and every one of
you.”
“So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president — he’ll never come between you and the best
our high school can be.”
Id.
105. Id. at 677.
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expression claim, reasoning that punishing such speech furthered the school’s
interest in “inculcat[ing] the habits and manners of civility.”106
Two years later in Hazelwood, the Court upheld a school principal’s
decision to delete two pages of a school newspaper prepared by students.107
The principal objected to two articles, one of which dealt with teen
pregnancies, and even though the girls were not identified, he was concerned
that they could be identified and their confidentiality violated. In addition “he
also believed that the article’s references to sexual activity and birth control
were inappropriate for some of the younger students the school.”108 The
second article dealt with a student’s negative comments about her father
regarding her parents’ divorce.109 The principal was concerned that the author
of the article had not interviewed the father. Because the principal did not
believe that sufficient time existed to make the changes and print the paper, he
deleted two pages of the paper containing the two articles in question in
addition to several others. In rejecting students’ free expression claims, the
Court reasoned that school administrators could act reasonably to edit the
student newspaper because it was part of the regular curriculum of the
journalism class.110 Relying on Bethel, the Court observed that “a school need
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational
mission’ . . . even though the government could not censor similar speech
outside the school.”111 In addition, as part of the curriculum, students could be
expected to follow appropriate journalistic standards.112 The Court reasoned
broadly that:
[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the
views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.113

Although the the Supreme Court granted broad discretion to school boards
in Bethel and Hazelwood to regulate student expression in public schools,
lower courts have relied on these cases to permit boards to regulate teacher

106. Id. at 681.
107. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274 (all facts in this section are taken from pages 262-64 of the
Court’s opinion).
108. Id. at 263.
109. Id. The principal’s concerns were that “the divorce story had complained that her father
‘wasn’t spending enough time with my mom, my sister and I’ prior to the divorce, ‘was always
out of town on business or out late playing cards with the guys,’ and ‘always argued about
everything’ with her mother.” Id.
110. Id. at 273.
111. Id. at 266.
112. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268.
113. Id. at 271.
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expression during the school day and the content of their classroom
instruction.114 Efforts under a variety of legal theories by teachers to change or
to personalize school curriculum have generally been rejected.
In Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School District,115 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of an English and Journalism teacher
who permitted her students, as part of their junior English class, to perform and
videotape a class play containing repeated profanity, contrary to a school
disciplinary code prohibiting student use of profanity.116 In reversing a
$500,000 jury verdict for the teacher on her free speech claim, the Eighth
Circuit, finding support in both Bethel and Hazelwood, held as a matter of law
that “the school board had a legitimate academic interest in prohibiting
profanity by students in their creative writing . . . . A flat prohibition of
profanity in the classroom is reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical
concern of promoting generally acceptable social standards.”117
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Boring v. Buncombe County
Board of Education, reached a result similar to Lacks, upholding transfer of a
drama teacher for permitting her students to perform a play containing “mature
subject matter.”118 The Fourth Circuit, relying on Hazelwood, held that the
teacher did not present a free speech claim because her selection and
performance of the play “[did] not present a matter of public concern and [was]
nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute.”119
In a California case that tangentially implicated a teacher, a California
statute provided the framework for students to challenge the school board’s
requirement that the students delete profanity from a film that they had written,
which had been approved by the teacher of their Film Arts class.120 Although
the statute expressed the broad intent that students have “the right to exercise
freedom of expression and the press,” it also charged the advisers of student
publications “to maintain professional standards of English and journalism.”121
The school district defined “profanity” in its regulations as “language which

114. See discussion below, infra notes 115-142 and accompanying text.
115. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998) (the Eighth
Circuit cites to both Bethel and Hazelwood for authority that regulation of teacher speech can be
done by public school boards as long as the regulation meets legitimate pedagogical interests).
116. The words used were “fuck,” “shit,” “ass,” “bitch,” and “nigger.” Id. at 719.
117. Id. at 724.
118. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). According to
the teacher’s complaint, the play “powerfully depicts the dynamics within a dysfunctional, singlefamily — a divorced mother and three daughters: one a lesbian, another pregnant with an
illegitimate child.” Id. at 366.
119. Id. at 368.
120. Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 765 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995).
121. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1993).
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would be used in the Tulare Advance-Register or the Fresno Bee.”122 Even
though the statute prohibited school boards from disciplining students for
engaging in protected speech, it did not prohibit a school board from requiring
that students delete the language.123
Teachers generally are limited in their ability to change school board
curriculum by adding to or deleting material. In Newton v. Slye, a federal
district court in West Virginia held that a school administrator’s directive that
an English teacher remove a “banned book” pamphlet from his class door was
not a violation of free speech, even though the teacher could distribute the
pamphlet in the classroom. 124 The court agreed with the administrator that the
pamphlet was part of the curriculum which could be controlled under
Hazelwood.125 The court observed that the school board had “taken steps to
control exposure of children to unsuitable matter” as reflected in the use of a
district-wide filtering system and special curricular programs such as Family
Life Education, Character Counts, the Code of Responsible Student Conduct,
and a Substance Abuse Policy.126 Posting the pamphlet, rather than handing it
out in class, sent a message at odds with a school curriculum “based on
community values . . . by the school board.”127
Similarly, in Murray v. Pittsburgh Board of Education, a teacher in an
Alternative Learning Center who was a proponent of a classroom management
technique known as Learnball could be ordered by her principal to stop using
the technique and to remove all Learnball literature, symbols, and
paraphernalia from her classroom. 128 In response to the teacher’s claim that
her free speech rights had been violated, the court observed that “a public
school classroom is a nonpublic forum,” and the principal had “the authority to
make all of the school’s administrative and educational decisions . . . .”129 The
mere fact that the principal has permitted teachers to decorate their rooms does
not mean that they have transformed the classroom into a limited public forum
for the expressive activity of teachers. Because the principal had a reasonable
basis for not favoring the Learnball approach based upon the technique’s ill-fit
within the school’s curricular objectives, the prohibition was permissible
because it did not represent viewpoint discrimination.130
Although school boards have broad authority to control instruction in
classrooms, that authority applies only where teachers have been made aware
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Lopez, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765 n.3.
Id. at 768; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1993).
Newton v. Slye, 116 F. Supp. 2d 677, 684 (W.D. Va. 2000).
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838, 844-45 (W.D. Pa. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 844.
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of board policies. In disputes involving a teacher’s knowledge of school board
policies, the teacher is likely to prevail against a school board under a free
speech claim, when the policy under which the board acts in disciplining a
teacher is vague and unenforceable or has never been distributed to the
teachers. In Wilder v. Board of Education of Jefferson County School District,
a teacher, terminated for showing an “R” rated film without following the
school board’s written controversial materials policy, succeeded in reversing
his termination where the policy was not in the teacher handbook, most
teachers were not aware of it, and the school’s principal did not believe that the
policy applied to the teacher.131 Although school boards can regulate teacher
classroom speech that is related to a legitimate pedagogical concern, they can
do so only when the teacher has received notice of what conduct is prohibited.
In a somewhat strained constitutional analysis, the court found that a teacher
does have a First Amendment interest in choosing a particular pedagogical
method for a course, but only to the extent to which the board has not clearly
expressed its pedagogical choices.132
Occasionally, teachers claim that they have a right under free exercise of
religion to inject personal religious elements into a classroom. Courts
consistently find that teachers’ inclusion of religion is not a protected activity
because it violates the Establishment Clause.133 Thus, in Marchi v. Board of
Cooperative Services of Albany, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the directive of a director of special education to a teacher that:
Public schools are prohibited from offering instruction in support of religious
beliefs or practices. Your personal beliefs about the role of religion in our
society and its value to families and their children cannot be a part of the
instruction given to your students.134

In asserting that a teacher “does not retain the full extent of free exercise rights
that he would enjoy as a private citizen,” the Second Circuit observed that a
teacher’s religious responses to student questions in the classroom135 must give
131. Wilder v. Bd. of Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 944 P.2d 598 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
The film, 1900, focusing on Italian life through the end of World War II, contained scenes of
nudity, sexual conduct, drug use, and violence. Id. at 599 (all facts in this section are taken from
pages 599-600 of the court’s opinion).
132. Id. at 603.
133. See, e.g., Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 472 (2d Cir.
1999).
134. Id.
135. Among the items considered objectionable were the teacher’s modification of his
instructional program “to discuss topics such as forgiveness, reconciliation, and God,” and a letter
to a parent that contained the following words:
Ryan had a good day today. I thank you and the LORD for the tape; it brings the Spirit of
Peace to the classroom. Tomorrow is a teacher’s conference and dismissal is at 11:30.
May God Bless you all richly.
Id. at 472-73.
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way to an employer’s legitimate interest “in avoiding litigation by those
contending that an employee’s desire to exercise his freedom of religion has
propelled his employer into an Establishment Clause violation.”136
In another case, school district officials could reassign a tenth-grade
biology teacher to teach ninth-grade earth science after he refused to teach
evolution.137 The court found little difficulty in concluding that the school
administrators had an “important pedagogical interest in establishing the
curriculum,” and in pursuit of that interest, the court reasoned that they had
“remained religiously neutral.”138 Likewise, a substitute teacher could be
removed from the substitute list for reading the Bible to a fifth grade class.139
When the teacher alleged that the school board had engaged in religious
discrimination in violation of Title VII,140 the court reasoned that school
administrators’ “repeated warnings against interjecting his religious beliefs
into the classroom [constituted] legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
dismissing him.”141
Given the broad grant of authority the Supreme Court has bestowed upon
school boards in Hazelwood and Bethel to control instruction, the rights of
teachers to insert their personal views and instructional techniques are, at best,
limited.142 That which occurs in the classroom is at the heart of the educational
process, and teachers will be expected to conform to the instructional
guidelines of school boards.
D. Associational Privacy
Teacher contacts with students either inside or outside school hours can be
the subject of school board discipline. Generally, the legal issues surrounding
improper conduct involving a teacher and his or her students focus on the
language of a state’s teacher dismissal statute, as opposed to teachers’ claims
that their right of privacy to engage in conduct with students has been violated.
Thus, under a broad penumbra of statutory language, including unprofessional
conduct, unfitness, willful neglect of duty, and immorality, courts consistently

136. Id. at 476.
137. Levake v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 656, 625 N.W.2d 502, 507-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
138. Id.
139. See Helland v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 1996).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (2000).
141. Helland, 93 F.3d at 330.
142. Cf. Padilla v. South Harrison R-H Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1999) (probationary
teacher who was acquitted of misdemeanor and felony charges involving alleged sexual assault
on a student could still be dismissed by the school board for a statement he made at his trial,
saying that he saw nothing wrong with consensual sex between a teacher and a student), with
Watson v. Eagle County Sch. Dist., 797 P.2d 768 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (probationary teacher
who was adviser of school newspaper had free speech right to refuse principal’s instruction to
publish a retraction of articles in the newspaper presenting the school in a negative light).
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have upheld dismissals of employees for misconduct involving students,
regardless of whether the conduct involved sexual contact143 or non-sexual
conduct reflecting an improper relationship.144 Courts tend to be very
generous with school boards in discharging employees who have engaged in
impermissible contact with students, even when that contact occurred in the
past.145
Occasionally though, issues involving privacy do surface when school
board disciplinary actions on teacher relationships with students are
challenged. In Holt v. Rapides School Board, a Louisiana court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s reversal of a school board’s decision to terminate a
female teacher for willful neglect of duty for sleeping with another female
student at a slumber party, and for giving the student birthday gifts.146 The
court reasoned that the conduct was related to “a family relationship” between
the teacher and the student.147 Although the court determined that the school
board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it lacked a rational
basis,148 the teacher, arguably, could, just as easily, have raised the claim that
the school board’s decision intruded upon her privacy.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,149 a non-education case, the Supreme
Court reflected in dictum that “choices to enter into and maintain certain
intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the
State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.”150 The family
relationship is one entitled to the highest level of protection from intrusion by
government because it “involve[s] deep attachments and commitments to the
143. See, e.g., Morris v. Clarksville-Montgomery County Consol. Bd. of Educ., 867 S.W.2d
324, 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (even though sexual contact with students did not meet
insubordination grounds for dismissal because there had been no order to cease conduct, the
dismissal could be supported on the ground of unprofessional conduct).
144. See, e.g., Kerin v. Bd. of Educ., Lamar Sch. Dist. No. RE-2, Prowers County, 860 P.2d
574, 582-83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (school board could dismiss teacher for fostering parent-child
type relationship with fourth-grade student and engaging in custody dispute with parent).
145. See, e.g., Parker v. Byron Center Pub. Schs., 582 N.W.2d 859 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(sexual relations with a student sixteen years earlier could support dismissal over teacher’s
evidentiary and probative claims); Toney v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., Bd. of
Educ., 881 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1994) (teacher could be dismissed for immorality for impregnating
fifteen-year-old student ten years earlier in another school district); Wright v. Mead Sch. Dist.,
944 P.2d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (sexual contact with students seven to ten years earlier
supported dismissal of teacher).
146. Holt v. Rapides Sch. Bd., 685 So.2d 501, 503-04 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
147. See id. at 503.
148. Id. at 504.
149. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984) (Supreme Court upheld state
gender discrimination claim against Jaycees for refusing to admit women, opining that the
organization’s expressive views did not prohibit admission of women).
150. Id. at 617-18.
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necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal
aspects of one’s life.”151 The kinds of personal family relationship areas where
the Supreme Court has provided protection include marriage,152 childbirth,153
the raising and educating of children,154 and cohabitation with one’s
relatives.155 Although all of these Supreme Court decisions addressed statutes
or ordinances that were facially unconstitutional, one could make an argument
in Holt that application of a school board rule prohibiting willful neglect of
duty to family relationships could also be subject to scrutiny under privacy
analysis. As the cases cited in the Roberts dictum indicate, teachers with
familial relationships can probably engage in certain kinds of conduct that
would be considered inappropriate if done outside a family relationship.156
A school board’s authority to intrude upon a teacher’s private life outside
the school is limited. In LaSota v. Town of Topsfield, an elementary school
teacher’s privacy rights were violated by a school district after she was
terminated for living with a man whom she married the year after her
dismissal.157 Prior to her marriage, her husband had been charged and
convicted of five counts of rape and abuse of his daughter. These charges were
151. Id. at 619-20.
152. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). In that case, the Supreme
Court struck down a Wisconsin statute prohibiting state residents with minor issue not in their
custody from marrying without court permission because “it would make little sense to recognize
a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision
to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.” Id.
153. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (Supreme Court
invalidated New York statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to persons over 16 years
of age except from registered pharmacist because “the decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds
a particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy”).
154. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977) (in upholding a
New York statute that established procedures for removing children from foster homes, the Court
nonetheless recognized privacy rights within such homes because “no one would seriously
dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or
her care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship; . . . we cannot dismiss the foster
family as a mere collection of unrelated individuals”).
155. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (plurality opinion). In
striking down city housing ordinance making it a “crime for homeowner to have living with her a
son and grandson plus second grandson who was cousin of first grandson,” the Court observed
that “the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . [d]ecisions concerning child
rearing, which Yoder, Meyer, Pierce and other cases have recognized as entitled to constitutional
protection, long have been shared with grandparents or other relatives who occupy the same
household indeed — who may take on major responsibility for the rearing of the children.” Id.
156. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
157. LaSota v. Town of Topsfield, 979 F. Supp. 45, 51 (D. Mass. 1997) (all facts in this
section are taken from pages 46-48 of the court’s opinion).
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reversed on appeal and eventually dismissed. In denying summary judgment
for the school district, a federal district court in Massachusetts held that
privacy rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment include “the right to
associate intimately with a person with whom one contemplates marriage,
without fear of government interference.”158 As a result, a teacher has “a
constitutional right to associate intimately without fear that the government
will use her associations when making decisions concerning her
employment.”159
However, family relationships (or what are alleged to be family
relationships) are not always outside the reach of school board control. In
Kerin v. Board of Education, Lamar School District, a Colorado appeals court
held that a school board had “good and just cause” to terminate a fourth grade
teacher who, over a period of two years, had established a close relationship
with a student, had persuaded the mother to give him power of attorney over
the child, and had initiated a custody action when the mother took the child
home to Mexico.160 As a result of considerable turmoil in the school
community when a court order that the teacher be given custody was dissolved,
the court held that the school board’s legitimate interest “in protecting the
school community from harm” outweighed the privacy interests of the
teacher.161 Similarly, a federal district court in Connecticut upheld the
dismissal of an elementary school social worker for living with a non-custodial
father of two children to whom she provided social services.162 The court
remarked that whatever rights of intimate association the social worker might
have under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment had to be balanced against those of the school board “in
promoting the efficiency of public services it performs through its employees”
and in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible.163 In ruling
for the school board, the court found persuasive the City Director of Health’s
reasonable belief that the social worker might have violated the ethics code,
brought discredit upon municipal service, and hindered other social workers in
their work.164
However, even if teacher conduct can be addressed by school boards, it
might not be subject to criminal prosecution. In a case with a remarkable

158. Id. at 50.
159. Id. However, this privacy was considered by the court not to be clearly established at the
time of the school board’s termination decision, and therefore, the administrators and individual
school board members were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 48.
160. Kerin v. Bd. of Educ., Lamar Sch. Dist. No. RE-2, Prowers County, 860 P.2d 574, 582
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
161. Id.
162. Kelly v. City of Meridien, 120 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192, 196 (D. Conn. 2000).
163. Id. at 197.
164. Id. at 197-98.
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result, State v. Eastwood, a Georgia appeals court affirmed a trial court
decision voiding a conviction under two counts of sodomy between a high
school teacher and a student at the ages of fifteen and seventeen.165 At the
time these acts occurred, Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute set the age of consent
at fourteen.166 However, the Supreme Court of Georgia, two years earlier, had
invalidated this statute because it included private, unforced, noncommercial
acts of sodomy between consenting adults (over age fourteen).167 Because the
conduct between the student and the teacher was “consensual, unforced,
private, and noncommercial” and the state legislature had not enacted a statute
specifically prohibiting the conduct between the student and the teacher, the
school district was not entitled to a special exception for teachers who engage
in voluntary acts with students.168 Thus, while the state “may impose
limitations on the right to privacy by enacting criminal statutes narrowly
tailored to prohibit such conduct,”169 it had failed to do so in this case.
Although this case was silent regarding whether the teacher could be dismissed
for his conduct that did not violate a state criminal statute, the law is fairly well
established that a school board can dismiss a teacher in an administrative
proceeding, regardless of the applicability of criminal statutes.170
By the very nature of the teaching function, teachers become
knowledgeable of, and occasionally involved in, the personal lives of their
students. Invariably, school boards set high standards of professionalism for
their teachers and will discipline those who cross over the limit of appropriate
relationships. Teachers who find themselves inappropriately involved with
their students will generally find little constitutional or statutory support for
their conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
The privacy rights of teachers in public schools are affected by the
diminished expectation of privacy that comes with working with minors who
are required to attend school. The personal privacy rights of teachers under the
Liberty Clause are in transition. Even though issues regarding gender nonconformity will probably be resolved under state statutes, local ordinances, or
school board rules protecting such status, as well as the Equal Protection
Clause, emerging issues involving the Full Faith and Credit Clause remain to
be resolved.
165. State v. Eastwood, 535 S.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). Subsequent to this case,
the state legislature changed the legal age for consent to sixteen. Id. at 247 n.1.
166. Id. at 247.
167. See generally Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
168. Eastwood, 535 S.E.2d at 247-48.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Padilla v. South Harrison R-H Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1999); Hudson
v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 572 N.W.2d 379 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997).
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Although the rights of teachers regarding search and seizure are not well
defined, courts have taken their lead from the Supreme Court’s search and
seizure cases involving students and have given school boards considerable
latitude in controlling teacher behavior in the classroom. Teachers have
considerable control over what occurs in the classroom, but their actions are
not outside the authority of school boards. Despite a number of constitutional
theories that teachers can raise to defend their conduct within classrooms, that
conduct is generally subject to school board discipline, especially when the
conduct relates to course content and methodologies.
Teacher conduct outside the school has greater protection for the teacher,
but if that conduct involves students, school boards have legitimate interests in
protecting students. Courts are able to draw fine lines and distinguish between
conduct that directly involves students with conduct that affects students only
indirectly. When conduct involves non-student adults, school boards have a
challenging task to connect associations outside the school to conduct within
the school.
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